More than 1,000 people have lost their lives in intense clashes in Syria following a violent outbreak between government supporters and individuals believed to be loyal to the deposed president, Bashar al-Assad.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the recent surge of violence has resulted in one of the highest death tolls since the conflict began 14 years ago. The British-based monitoring group reported that within just two days, the number of casualties soared, making this one of the deadliest periods in the country’s prolonged war.
The Syrian government has attributed the unrest to remnants of Assad’s forces, while also downplaying the events as the result of “individual actions.” However, reports indicate that 745 civilians, the majority of whom were victims of mass killings, have died. Additionally, 148 pro-Assad fighters and 125 members of the security forces were among the dead, according to SOHR.
No official death toll has been released by Syrian authorities.
Despite the ongoing clashes, Syria’s leader, ex-ISIS and al-Qaeda leader, al-Jolani, Ahmed al-Sharaa, urged for unity and an end to hostilities.
“We have to preserve national unity and domestic peace, we can live together,” he stated.
Sharaa, who leads the new Islamist government, sought to reassure citizens of Syria’s resilience.
“Rest assured about Syria, this country has the characteristics for survival.
“What is currently happening in Syria is within the expected challenges,” he added.
Who Are the Alawites?
The Alawites are a religious minority in Syria, tracing their origins to Shia Islam. Former President Bashar al-Assad belonged to this sect, which makes up approximately 10% of Syria’s predominantly Sunni Muslim population. The group is primarily concentrated in the country’s coastal regions.
During Assad’s rule, the Alawites were a crucial part of his power structure, holding influential positions within the military and security forces. However, following his removal, many Alawites were dismissed from their jobs, while former soldiers who pledged loyalty to the new government were reportedly killed.
The situation has escalated as Sunni militant groups loyal to the new Islamist rulers have carried out revenge attacks against Alawite civilians, blaming them for recent assaults on government security forces.
Minority communities such as the Kurds, Christians, and Druze have also voiced their concerns about retaliatory violence. Despite the government’s assurances of inclusivity, many fear that retribution against Assad’s former allies will persist.
How the Bloodshed Unfolded
SOHR reported that violence erupted on Thursday afternoon, following an ambush by pro-Assad militants on Syrian security forces in Latakia, a stronghold of the Alawite community. The attack triggered a series of retaliatory killings.
By Friday, Sunni fighters loyal to the government had launched reprisals, targeting Alawite civilians.
A resident of Baniyasin, a coastal town, provided a harrowing account of the massacre.
“They forcibly brought people down to the streets, then they lined them up and started shooting them,” he recalled.
“They left nobody. They left nobody at all. The scene that I saw was pure horror; it is just indescribable.”
The witness, whose identity has been concealed for safety reasons, also described disturbing acts of brutality, including women being forced to walk naked before being executed. He recounted how a teenage boy was given a rifle and forced to shoot his own family.
“The victims of this massacre were all civilians – just civilians and not Assad loyalists,” he said.
Seeking refuge, he managed to hide in a bin before escaping under the cover of night.
Other survivors from Alawite communities corroborated similar stories, telling the Associated Press that gunmen had executed Alawites—mostly men—either in the streets or at their doorsteps. Homes were ransacked and set ablaze, according to residents in hiding.
Mass Killings and Aftermath Targets Alawites
SOHR reported that the revenge killings subsided early on Saturday, yet the scale of destruction remains immense.
Rami Abdurrahman, founder of SOHR, described the atrocities as one of the worst in Syria’s conflict.
“This was one of the biggest massacres during the Syrian conflict,” he stated.
Meanwhile, Syria’s state media reported that all major roads leading to the coastal region had been closed, purportedly to restore order and prevent further violence.
SOHR also confirmed that electricity and drinking water had been cut off in large parts of Latakia, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.
A Syrian defence ministry official, quoted in state media, asserted that government forces had regained control of most areas previously occupied by Assad’s supporters.
In the village of Tuwaym, the bodies of 31 victims—including nine children and four women—were buried in a mass grave, according to local sources.
A separate funeral was held in Al Janoudiya, where four members of Syria’s security forces were laid to rest.
Initially, SOHR estimated the death toll at over 200, but the latest figures confirm that more than 1,000 people have died, marking a grim new chapter in Syria’s prolonged and devastating conflict.
Who is al-Jolani, Ahmed al-Sharaa?
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani: The Leader of Syria’s Most Powerful Jihadist Group
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani is a Syrian jihadist leader and the founder of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group that has evolved from being an affiliate of al-Qaeda to the dominant force in Idlib, northwestern Syria.
Al-Jolani Rise to Power
Al-Jolani first emerged as a key figure during Syria’s civil war as the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. Initially, he pledged loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the leader of al-Qaeda, and his group played a crucial role in the Syrian opposition’s fight against Bashar al-Assad’s government.
In 2013, Jolani’s death squads murdered one of Syria’s most prominent Sunni clerics, Said Ramadan Al-Bouti, while he read from the Quran, and killed scores of students in his mosque – all because he opposed the dirty war they waged on his nation. This has always been their way. https://t.co/nukQblRCyG
— Max Blumenthal (@MaxBlumenthal) March 9, 2025
However, in 2016, al-Jolani announced a formal split from al-Qaeda and rebranded his group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, claiming this move was meant to remove Western justifications for attacking rebel-held areas. Later, in 2017, the group evolved into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), absorbing other rebel factions and asserting control over Idlib Province, Syria’s last major opposition stronghold.
HTS and Its Role in Syria
HTS has remained the dominant militant force in Idlib, clashing both with Assad’s forces and rival extremist factions like Hurras al-Din, an al-Qaeda-linked splinter group. Though HTS claims to have severed ties with global jihadist networks, it remains designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Turkey, and the United Nations.
⚡️⭕️ The CIA arranges a new interview with Jolani on CNN, while still having a bounty of 10 million $ on his head since 2017.
He’s now rebranded, and ready to join the civilized world.pic.twitter.com/VmCylfZpZF— Middle East Observer (@ME_Observer_) December 6, 2024
Al-Jolani has attempted to rebrand himself as a pragmatic leader, presenting HTS as a Syrian nationalist movement rather than a global jihadist force. In rare interviews, he has argued that his group seeks to protect Syria’s Sunni population rather than wage international jihad. He has even appeared in Western-style suits, a stark contrast to his previous militant image, to appeal to foreign governments and position HTS as a political player in post-war Syria.
Erdogan and Turkey’s Role in overthrowing Assad
Turkey has long sought to establish itself as the most dominant foreign player in Syria. Since the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, Ankara forged close ties with jihadist factions opposing Bashar al-Assad’s government, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which spearheaded the final push against Assad’s forces. Following Assad’s ousting in December 2024, Ahmad al-Sharaa, who led HTS until its disbandment, assumed the transitional presidency.
Ankara is now portraying Syria’s new administration as moderate in a bid to justify its deepening involvement. However, both al-Sharaa and HTS remain blacklisted by the United Nations and the United States as terrorist entities due to their well-documented ties to al-Qaeda.
From Allies to Adversaries: The Erdogan-Assad Relationship
During the 1990s, under Hafez al-Assad’s rule, Syria deliberately destabilized Turkey by offering refuge and training to members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group designated as a terrorist organization by both Ankara and Washington. By 1998, tensions reached a boiling point, with Turkey threatening military intervention unless Damascus expelled PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.
However, when Bashar al-Assad took power in 2000, diplomatic relations between the two nations improved. Turkey’s then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan adopted a policy of “Zero Problems with Neighbors,” fostering closer economic and political ties with Syria. This period of reconciliation, lasting until 2011, was further strengthened by a personal friendship between Erdogan and Assad, even extending to shared family holidays, such as their luxurious retreat in Bodrum in 2009.
Turkey’s Support for Sunni Islamist Forces in Syria
With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Erdogan quickly distanced himself from Assad, convinced that his regime would collapse like those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Turkey saw an opportunity to install a Sunni Islamist government in Syria, one that would be loyal to Ankara and ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.
By August 2011, Turkey facilitated the formation of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, presenting it as a coalition of opposition groups, though it was dominated by Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members.
Ankara’s Material Backing of Syrian Rebels and Jihadist Militias
From 2012 onwards, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) provided weapons, funding, and logistical support to various Syrian rebel factions. Among them were groups that later became internationally recognized as terrorist organizations, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate.
As predictable as this is, it’s still infuriating to see it. For decades, Bashar al-Assad protected minority religious communities in Syria, including the country’s large Christian population. No one in the United States was allowed to notice this, and anyone who did was… https://t.co/bPsre7rRNO
— Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson) March 7, 2025
Even as extremist elements became increasingly evident, Ankara continued to facilitate their movement, allowing militants to cross the Turkish border freely. Reports suggested that ISIS and other jihadist factions exploited Turkey’s porous borders, using them for arms smuggling, financing operations, and trafficking oil while recruiting foreign fighters.
Turkey’s Expanding Control Over Northern Syria
By 2017, Turkey consolidated its control over parts of northern Syria through the establishment of a proxy rebel force, the Syrian National Army (SNA). This coalition of secular and jihadist opposition factions was tasked with securing Turkish military bases and countering Kurdish forces along the border.
From 2019 onwards, Ankara’s influence over northwest Syria became increasingly apparent. Turkish officials assumed administrative control, establishing government offices, postal services, and introducing the Turkish lira as the local currency.
Clashes with Kurdish Forces: Turkey’s Shifting Priorities
Despite initial ambitions to overthrow Assad, Turkey’s focus pivoted in 2015 following Russia’s military intervention in Syria, which reinforced Assad’s position. Concurrently, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), backed by the United States, expanded their territorial control in northern Syria to combat ISIS.
Fearing a Kurdish stronghold along its border, Turkey launched three military incursions between 2016 and 2019, directly targeting YPG-controlled areas. Erdogan justified these operations by asserting that the YPG had direct ties to the PKK, branding it a terrorist organization. However, Washington’s military support for the YPG only strengthened, as it became a central component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Human Rights Violations Under Turkish-Backed Militias
Armed groups benefiting from Ankara’s patronage have been implicated in grave human rights abuses, particularly against Kurdish populations in Turkish-occupied Syria.
In August 2024, the United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two key SNA factions, the Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza Brigade, for their involvement in torture, extortion, abductions, and sexual violence against civilians.
The U.S. State Department’s human rights reports also cited United Nations findings that detailed “the frequent presence of Turkish officials in SNA detention facilities … where torture was used.”
Turkey’s Relationship with HTS and the Syrian Transition
Despite officially designating HTS as a terrorist organization, Ankara maintained a working relationship with the group. Turkish troops stationed in HTS-controlled Idlib province effectively shielded the group from attacks by Assad’s forces. Furthermore, Turkey facilitated the flow of humanitarian aid and trade into HTS-controlled territories, indirectly bolstering its influence.
HTS formally dissolved on January 29, 2025, yet Turkey swiftly pivoted to engaging with Syria’s new leadership. Within days of Assad’s fall, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin personally met with transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus.
In February 2025, Erdogan hosted al-Sharaa in Ankara, affirming Turkey’s unwavering support. Erdogan commended al-Sharaa’s pledge to combat terrorism, including ISIS and the U.S.-backed SDF. In return, al-Sharaa assured that Syria would not permit any Kurdish self-rule or activities that might threaten Turkey.
Turkey’s Strategy to Position Syria as a Turkish Ally
Turkey is now attempting to reframe al-Sharaa al-Jolani as a moderate leader to secure international recognition for Syria’s new administration.
“No religion or ethnic group is excluded,”
Turkish officials have emphasized, presenting the new government as **inclusive**. However, al-Sharaa’s past complicates this portrayal. Before rebranding himself as a statesman, **al-Sharaa—previously known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—led HTS and maintained a hardline Salafi-jihadi ideology**. While he distanced his group from al-Qaeda, his commitment to its fundamental ideology remained.
By positioning Syria’s new leadership as legitimate, Turkey hopes to ease sanctions imposed on Syria during the Assad era and position itself as a key partner in Syria’s reconstruction.
Syria as a Launchpad for Turkish Regional Ambitions
Erdogan’s broader vision extends beyond securing Syria as a Turkish ally—he seeks to use Syria as a springboard for regional power projection.
Turkey has reportedly begun negotiations with the new Syrian government to establish a joint defense pact, which could lead to Turkish airbases in central Syria and military training programs for Syria’s new army.
Erdogan also sees an opportunity to eradicate the SDF, raising the possibility of a large-scale Turkish military campaign targeting Kurdish forces. Such a move would reinforce his domestic image as a leader uncompromising on terrorism.
